

'fertility' of Hydra (cf. *fecundo vulnere, fertilis*).⁵ Now, this joke sounds much more interesting and paradoxical, if *redundabat* has just reminded us that the *serpens...fertilis* can actually be regarded as nothing but the *sterile* Lernaean marsh.

St John's College, Oxford/Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa SERGIO CASALI

⁵ cf. Ov. *Met.* 9.70 'vulneribus fecunda suis', Germ. 543 'fecundam...hydram', Sen. *H.F.* 529 'colla feracia', 781 'fecunda...capita', *H.O.* 258, 1292, *Ag.* 835 'morte fecundo...dracone', Mart. 9.101.9.

OCTAVIAN AND ORESTES IN PAUSANIAS

M. J. Dewar¹ argues that in Georg. 1.511–4 Virgil may have been drawing a disquieting parallel between Orestes, evoked through an imitation of Aeschylus ('Choeph.' 1021–5), and Octavian, present a few lines above (498ff.).

Pausanias probably supports this suggestion; he shows that the link Octavian–Orestes existed quite early and in a sense favourable to Octavian, even though it may soon have been used in a negative sense by anti-Caesarian propaganda on account of the dark side of the myth. In front of the temple of Hera in Argos there was still visible in the second century a statue representing Orestes, but identified by the inscription as Augustus.² Certainly this parallel Augustus–Orestes was not proposed – and preserved – with polemical purpose in a famous sanctuary and in the Augustan age. Given the resemblance between history and myth and the moral weight of the famous myth itself, it is unlikely that we have to do with the mere re-use of any old statue.

The inscription was most probably engraved during the life of Augustus, probably soon after the vengeance taken at Philippi against the murderers of his 'father' Julius Caesar (42 B.C.). Actually Pausanias says 'the emperor Augustus' (name after 27 B.C.), but he probably wants to be understood readily, and does not quote from the inscription itself.

Rome

NATALE CECIONI

¹ 'Octavian and Orestes in the Finale of the First Georgic', *CQ* 38 (1988), 563–5; 'Octavian and Orestes again', *CQ* 40 (1990), 580–82.

² Paus. 2, 17, 3; see Frazer's commentary (1898) *ad loc.* and 1, 18, 3 about reconversions of ancient statues in favour of living personalities.

A TEXTUAL NOTE ON GALEN, *ON THE POWERS OF FOODSTUFFS* I 1.3 (P. 202.17 HELMREICH)

In *De alimentorum facultatibus*, Book I, Ch. 1, Galen begins his discussion of the powers of foodstuffs by a rough sketch of the opinions of earlier physicians on this subject. He says that according to some of them these powers are only known (*ἐγνώσθαι*) on the basis of experience (*πείρα*), according to others on the basis of a combination of experience and reasoning (*λογισμός*), whereas a third group gave priority of importance to reasoning (202.4–6 Helmreich). Galen proceeds to say that there is considerable disagreement between these physicians on the topic in question and that, consequently, an unbiased testing of their opinions is necessary; this testing should operate by means of argumentation (*ἀπόδειξις*). Now there are two different starting-points for argumentation, i.e. perception and 'distinct thinking' (*ἡ γὰρ ἐξ αἰσθήσεως ἢ ἐκ νοήσεως ἐναργούς*). Then the text printed by Helmreich runs as

follows: καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἢ θατέρῳ τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέροις χρῆσασθαι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματος εὑρεσιν: 'It is necessary for us, too, to use either one of these (i.e. either perception or thinking) or both of them in order to find the question under discussion.'

In this sentence, the word εὑρεσιν is awkward, for the object to be found is already present, namely the προκειμένον σκέμμα. Now one might argue that this 'question under discussion' is what the powers of foodstuffs are and that in this respect the use of the verb 'find' is, of course, quite understandable, as appears in lines 21–2: διὰ ταύτης μόνης εὐρήσθαι τὰς δυνάμεις τῆς τροφῆς. However, it is not the question that should be found, but the answer or the solution to the question, σκέμμα meaning 'question', 'inquiry', 'problem'.¹ Again, one might say that the word εὑρεσιν itself should be interpreted as 'finding of a solution' or as equivalent to εὕρημα. But there are no satisfactory parallels for this use.²

A more plausible solution presents itself when we consider that the transmitted text may not be reliable. εὑρεσιν is the reading of MS. C and of the Charterian edition, whereas MSS A and P read ἄθροισιν ('collecting'). This variant is not satisfactory either, since it also involves the difficulty of supplying something which is already there. Instead I suggest to read κρίσιν, 'judgment'; this gives good sense in the context, for in this section Galen is primarily concerned with the question who of the earlier physicians is right: the question what the powers of the foodstuffs are is addressed by means of a dialectical scrutiny of the opinions of earlier physicians. This is evident from lines 11–12, which use metaphorical language derived from the administration of justice (ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι βασανίσαι τὰ πρὸς αὐτῶν γεγραμμένα δικαστὰς ἀδεκάστους γενομένους: ἄδικον γὰρ ἐνὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων πιστεῦσαι χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως). In the immediately following sentence (17–18) Galen proceeds by saying: 'Since judgments through reason are not similarly easy for all people...' (οὐσῶν δὲ τῶν διὰ τοῦ λόγου κρίσεων οὐχ ἅπασιν ὁμοίως εὐπετῶν), which, on this reading, provides a good example of anaphoric recapitulation by means of a participle construction. Moreover, the use of the article τῶν in this sentence can better be explained, the word κρίσις having been mentioned in the preceding sentence. It is not difficult to imagine how σκέμματος κρίσιν was changed by a scribal error into σκέμματος εὑρεσιν, which was subsequently changed into ἄθροισιν by later scribes who had difficulty with εὑρεσιν. Finally, this use of κρίσις has many parallels in Galen, e.g. in his commentaries on *On the Nature of Man*, II 6, pp. 68.24–69.20

¹ As far as I know, no instances of σκέμμα in the sense of 'solution' or 'answer' are found: the word signifies either the subject of investigation or the investigation itself.

² Helmreich refers to Galen's *Thrasylbus* where we read: ἀρχὴ τοίνυν εὐρέσεως οὐ τούτῳ μόνῳ τῷ νῦν προκειμένῳ σκέμματι τὸ γνῶναι, τί ποτ' ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν (*Scripta Minora* III, 33, 7–8), where εὑρεσις seems to mean 'finding an answer'; but here the construction is with a dative, whereas in the present case it is the σκέμμα itself which is the object of finding. Support for εὑρεσις might be found in a passage from the *Commentary on the Aphorisms*, I 1, 17B.346 K., but this does not provide evidence for σκέμμα being the object of εὐρίσκειν either: τί δὲ βουλόμενος ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ἐχρήσατο τοιοῦτω προομιῇ τῶν ἀπορωτάτων ἐστὶ. τάχα δ' ἂν εὐροῖμεν αὐτό, τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἅπαντα τοῦ λόγου προδιασκηφάμενοι... ὀργάνων τε δυοῖν ὄντων ὑφ' οἷν εὐρίσκεται τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, ἡ πείρα, σφαλερόν ἐστι, τὸ δ' ἕτερον, ἡ ἐκ λόγου κρίσις, οὐκ εὐπετές, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν δυσκολωτάτων... σφαλερὰ δὲ ἡ πείρα, διὰ τὸ τῆς ὑλῆς ἀξίωμα, οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἐτοιμῶς, ἐν γὰρ τῷ τοῦ καιροῦ βραχυχρονίῳ περιέχεται τοῦτο. τὴν κρίσιν δέ, εἰ μὲν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, τὸι λόγον ἀκούει τις, εὐδελον δὴ πού τοι χαλεπώτατον αὐτοῦ μέχρι τήμερον ἐπ' ἀμφισβητούμενον· εἰ δ', ὡς ἐνίοι τῶν ἐμπειρικῶν ὑπονοοῦσι, τὴν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐκ πείρας ἐπικρίσιν καὶ οὕτως εὐδελον τὸ δυσκατόρθωτον αὐτῆς.

(Mewaldt) and on *Regimen in Acute Diseases* I 17, pp. 133.30–134.11 (Helmreich):
 δέδεικται δέ μοι κἀν τῷ Περὶ ἀγμῶν καὶ ἄρθρων ἔθος Ἰπποκράτει τοὺς
 ὑποπεπτωκότας λόγους ἑτέροις τισὶ καθολικωτέροις ἐπισημαίνεσθαι καὶ τήν γε
 διδασκαλίαν τῶν καθόλου δι' αὐτῶν ποιείσθαι προκειμένων ὡς παραδειγμάτων·
 οὕτως γὰρ οὔτε ἀποχωρεῖ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματος οὔτε πολλαχῶς διδάσκει τὸ
 κοινὸν πολλῶν. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς πτισάνης τὸν λόγον ἐποίησατο τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς περὶ
 αὐτῆς διαφωνίας καὶ ζητήσας καὶ κρίνας, οὕτω καὶ περὶ διαίτης ἀπάσης τῶν ὀξέων
 τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθὴν ἐποίησατο. καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ φλεβοτομίας καὶ καθάρσεως...οὐ
 σμικρὰ γέγονε διαφωνία τοῖς ἰατροῖς.³

Leiden

PHILIP VAN DER EIJK

³ This article was written in the course of a research project funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), project number 301-176-048.